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IV 
PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
1. Repeal of Idaho Code Title 30, Chapter 6 
The Respondent ' s Briefreferences the repeal ofldaho Code Title 30, Chapter 6 
effective July 15, 2015 . This action commenced October 21, 2013. The order granting 
summary judgment entered November 30, 2014. The motion for reconsideration was 
denied May 21 , 2015. The final submission to the trial court was June 15, 2015. The trial 
court's ruling on the final submissions entered October 8, 2015, and its final action was 
entry of judgment October 19, 2015. Because the action was substantially adjudicated 
prior to July 15, 2015, Idaho Code Title 30, Chapter 6 has been cited as the applicable law 
with exception of where the application would be to post-judgment circumstances. Idaho 
Code§ 73-101; Edwards v. Walker, 95 Idaho 289,507 P.2d 486 (1973). 
2. Judicial Admissions 
The Respondent's Brief makes the following judicial admissions: 
a) At Page 1 (L.3) it states that: "Ninety-nine percent of the ownership--
"transferable interest--" of the LLC ("99%") was held by John C. Slavens ... " There is a 
significant difference between a transferable interest and a membership. This continues the 
confusion resulting from using terminology not recognized by and often inconsistent with the Idaho 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, or using defined terms without respect to their 
definitions. To suggest that "ownership" is equivalent to "transferable interest" ignores that the 
holder of a transferable interest is precluded from management, conduct of the company's activities 
and is not a member. Idaho Code§ 30-6-102 (12), (14), (26); Idaho Code§ 30-6-401; Idaho 
Code§ 30-6-502 and Official Comment. 
b) At Page 9 (Para. 3) it states that John: 
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(ii) transferred the 99% to Adam, Alexa and Tanner and then (iii) resigned his 
own LLC membership, having completed his duties as trustee as Jim had asked 
and instructed him. 
This also appears in John's affidavit where he purports to "resign my LLC 
membership in Twin G Holdings, LLC ..... " but conditions it on a final judgment. R. 
Vol. I, p.152, L. 17. 
If John was actually a member, and remained a member after the transfer to Adam, 
Alexa, and Tanner, then, as a matter oflaw, he only transferred the transferrable interest 
and the transferees are not members. If John resigned a membership he held, it was a 
disassociation under Idaho Code§§ 30-6-601 and 30-6-602. 
c) At Page 21 (Para. 3) the Respondents' Brief addresses the treatment of 
Twin G's income for tax purposes. The record establishes that James and Melanie jointly 
declared all Twin G's income on their tax returns. R. Vol. I, p. 303, L. 8. It also 
establishes that John did not receive any K-1 's reporting income from Twin G and there is 
no evidence of John either individually or as a trustee reporting such income. R. Vol. I, p. 
423, L. 18. 
The brief asserts that because it is a grantor trust, the grantor is required to report 
the income. That rule only applies where the grantor is also the trustee or at least retains 
the rights of control and enjoying the benefits of the trust in whole or in part. 26 U.S.C. §§ 
671-677, 679. If that is true, complete and permanent dominion and control over the 
alleged trust assets was never transferred to John and therefore no gift to the alleged trust 
was completed prior to James death. That is exactly what Melanie is arguing. 
3. Typographical Error. At page 6 line 5 of Appellant's Brief the date is set forth as 
December 19, 2013. It should be December 19, 2012. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Eldest Children's statement of facts is not a literal recitation of the Record. It 
often is a rhetorical summarization or expansion relying heavily on inferences or 
conclusions. It also relies heavily on the affidavit of John which has been challenged for 
competency. 
For one example, in the first paragraph of the statement of facts it makes reference 
to a judgment against Rocky Atwood of Kuna, Idaho and to James obtaining title to Mr. 
Atwood's house in partial a satisfaction of his judgment lien. The only reference to the 
record is to the Affidavit of John C. Slaven, ',r 6, R. 147," which doesn't reference any 
such judgment, the date it entered, a judgment lien, or partial satisfaction. The statement 
may well be true and may well appear elsewhere in the Record but the statement of facts 
doesn't tell us where. In addition, the cited provision recites a series of transactions to 
which it appears John was not a party. There is no foundation establishing John's 
competence to testify as to such matters, and John is not identified as a participant or 
someone with personal knowledge of the transactions. 
In the second paragraph, the statement of facts states "Jim had an operating 
agreement drafted for the LLC that so specified Johnny as having 99% "Ownership 
interest/sharing ratio" to Jim's 1 % listing both of them as LLC members but only Jim as its 
manager. Reference is made to "R. 149, 154-178 (in particular, 177)." Presumably the 
references are to pages. On page 149 of the Record, which is in the 1st Affidavit of John C. 
Slavens, it references an unsigned document John states he received from an attorney in 
Boise following James's death. The references to pages 154 to 178 are what is represented 
as the document received from the Boise attorney. There is also no foundation taking it 
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out of the hearsay rule. The statement is partially true, but the statement of facts cannot be 
relied upon to have actually established where the fact appears in the Record. 
Again, in the second paragraph, the statement of facts states "Melanie has admitted 
that the unsigned Operating Agreement accurately reflected Jim' s desires for the LLC from 
its organization until at least April 2011." Petitioner refers to the Record at the 
"Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, p. 54, L. 10-p.55, L. 2 R. 105." Melanie's actual 
testimony appearing at that location is as follows: 
Q. (BY MR. SIMMONS) The Exhibit 5.1 is the operating agreement. Have 
you had an opportunity, Melanie, to read it in this litigation? 
A. Um-hmm. Yes, I have. 
Q. Thank you. Did you see anything in there that was contrary to what you 
understood was Jim's desires with respect to the LLC? 
A. Initially, no. 
Q. You say, "Initially, no," but since that initial impression, has anything 
come up? 
A. Oh, when I say initially, because apparently this operating agreement 
was drafted in 2005 when the discussions were had, you know, and the 
decisions were made to put the Kuna property in the Twin G Holdings. 
After the fact, after this e-mail conversation and after the addendum was 
returned to our office and to Jim, then, yeah, things changed. So this was 
not his understanding nor mine. 
There is no reference to April 2011. This quotation is repeated later a number of time with 
additional expansion. 
The above pattern of incorrect citation to the Record consistently continues through 
the remaining paragraphs of the statement of facts, and the body of the brief. The heavy 
reliance on hearsay, inference, assumption and expansion is inconsistent with a summary 
judgment. 
One other thing that should be looked at closely is the Eldest Children's claim that, 
many places in the brief, Melanie' s testimony was contradictory. They successfully argued 
this before the trial court which expressly declined to consider portions of Melanie' s 
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supplemental affidavit. Note the Eldest Children do not point out with specificity where 
these contradictions actually occurred. In their brief they rely instead on the findings of the 
trial court. If the Eldest Children maintain that Melanie was contradictory, at least that 
contradiction should be pointed out with specificity as to its locations in the record. But 
the emphasis on contradiction would seem to admit, for the purposes of summary 
judgment, that the record is contradictory. 
The Eldest Children's statement of facts and heavy reliance on factual arguments 
together with their attribution to the record point out clearly why the summary judgment 
was inappropriate. Reliance by the moving party on inference is not permissible. The facts 
are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences 
are to be drawn in its favor. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 339, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). Issues 
of James's intent are raised. Intent of the parties is a question of fact. Carl H Christensen 
Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999). The arguments 
challenging the alleged inconsistencies in Melanie's testimony go to her credibility. It is 
not appropriate for a trial judge to assess the credibility of the parties to a summary 
judgment proceeding and rule based on that determination. Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 
868 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1994). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Full Faith and Credit. 
Melanie filed a petition for appointment as personal representative of James's 
estate in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Millard County State of Utah in Probate 
Number 123700041. The Utah court issued Letters of Special Administration on January 
2, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 91, L. 1. Melanie filed a Motion for Formal Appointment and James 
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Adam Slavens, son of James Kenneth Slavens and one of the Eldest Children, filed a 
counter petition for formal probate. R. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 1. The matter was scheduled for 
hearing on or about October 23, 2013, and the court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw. R. Vol. I, p. 88. L. 1. While the Utah motion was pending, and two 
days before the hearing, the Eldest Children filed the petition in this action on October 21, 
2013. R. Vol. I, p. 17, L. 30; R. Vol. I, p. 14, L. 1. The Utah court granted James Adam 
Slavens's request for an order of formal probate, R. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 1, on November 13, 
2013, and Letters Testamentary formally appointing Melanie were issued on November 14, 
2013. R. Vol. I, p. 87, L. 1. 
Melanie filed a Motion to Dismiss in this case. R. Vol. I, p. 81, L. 1. It was not an 
I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(8) motion based upon another action pending between the same 
parties for the same cause nor as a venue issue. It was an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. Under no circumstances is an action of this type appropriate 
in a District Court. This is an action, in part, against a personal representative of a pending 
Utah estate to adjudicate the interest of the estate in property. 
The District Court is without jurisdiction whether or not the Utah probate was filed. 
Assuming no Utah probate was pending, the Eldest Children could not sue James, he was 
dead, and there was no estate or personal representative to sue. 
§ 15-3-104. Claims against decedent--Necessity of administration 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a 
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed 
by the procedure prescribed by this chapter. After distribution a creditor 
whose claim has not been barred may recover from the distributees as 
provided in section 15-3-1004 of this code or from a former personal 
representative individually liable as provided in section 15-3-1005 of this 
code. This section has no application to a proceeding by a secured creditor 
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of the decedent to enforce his right to his security except as to any 
deficiency judgment which might be sought therein. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 15-3-104 (West). 
The corresponding Utah statute provides: 
§ 75-3-104. Claims against decedent--Necessity of administration 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a 
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed 
by the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3, Probate of Wills and 
Administration. After distribution a creditor whose claim has not been 
barred may recover from the distributees as provided in Section 75-3-1004 
or from a former personal representative individually liable as provided in 
Section 75-3-1005. This section has no application to a proceeding by a 
secured creditor of the decedent to enforce his right to his security except 
as to any deficiency judgment which might be sought therein. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 (West). 
If they wished to pursue the action, and if they are correct that the situs of the membership 
was in Idaho, they had every right to apply for appointment of a personal representative 
where the property was located. Idaho Code§ 15-3-201 provides: 
§ 15-3-201. Venue For First and Subsequent Estate Proceedings --
Location of Property. (a) Venue for the first informal or formal testacy or 
appointment proceedings after a decedent's death is: 
(1) In the county where the decedent had his domicile at the time of his 
death; or 
(2) If the decedent was not domiciled in this state, in any county where 
property of the decedent was located at the time of his death. 
(b) Venue for all subsequent proceedings within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the court is in the place where the initial proceeding occurred, unless the 
initial proceeding has been transferred as provided in section 15-1-303 of 
this code or subsection ( c) of this section. 
(c) If the first proceeding was informal, on application of an interested 
person and after notice to the proponent in the first proceeding, the court, 
upon finding that venue is elsewhere, may transfer the proceeding and the 
file to the other court. 
(d) For the purpose of aiding determinations concerning location of assets 
which may be relevant in cases involving nondomiciliaries, a debt, other 
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than one evidenced by investment or commercial paper or other instrument 
in favor of a nondomiciliary, is located where the debtor resides or, if the 
debtor is a person other than an individual, at the place where it has its 
principal office. Commercial paper, investment paper and other instruments 
are located where the instrument is. An interest in property held in trust is 
located where the trustee may be sued. 
The corresponding Utah Statute is: 
§ 75-3-201. Venue for first and subsequent estate proceedings--
Location of property 
( 1) Venue for the first informal or formal testacy or appointment 
proceedings after a decedent's death is: 
(a) In the county where the decedent had his domicile at the time of his 
death. 
(b) If the decedent was not domiciled in this state, in any county where 
property of the decedent was located at the time of his death. 
(2) Venue for all subsequent proceedings involving administration and 
distribution of decedent's estates is in the place where the initial 
proceeding occurred, unless the initial proceeding has been transferred as 
provided in Subsection (3) of this section or in Section 75-1-303. 
(3) If the first proceeding was informal, on application of an interested 
person and after notice to the proponent in the first proceeding, the court, 
upon finding that venue is elsewhere, may transfer the proceeding and the 
file to the other court. 
( 4) For the purpose of aiding determinations concerning location of assets 
which may be relevant in cases involving nondomiciliaries, a debt, other 
than one evidenced by investment or commercial paper or other 
instrument in favor of a nondomiciliary, is located where the debtor 
resides, or if the debtor is a person other than an individual, at the place 
where it has its principal office. Commercial paper, investment paper, and 
other instruments are located where the instrument is. An interest in 
property held in trust is located where the trustee may be sued. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-201 (West). 
James was not domiciled in Idaho so the basis of a filing would be limited 
to a claim that the membership interest was located in Bingham County Idaho. But 
there is another problem. While John purported to transfer 99% of the ownership 
and sharing rights in Twin G to the Eldest Children (R. Vol. I, pg.182, L. 1 ), he 
retained the Twin G membership interest which he resigned in his affidavit 
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conditioned upon a final non-appealable judgment upholding the claims of the 
Eldest Children. R. Vol. I. pg. 152, L. 17. Based upon his version, he was still a 
trustee of the membership when this action was filed. The last subsection of Idaho 
Code § 15-3-201 states in part: "An interest in property held in trust is located 
where the trustee may be sued." John is a resident of Texas and argues he is a 
trustee of a Utah trust. 
Now consider the effect of the pending Utah probate. Venue in Idaho under Idaho 
Code§ 15-3-201 could only apply if it was the "first informal or formal testacy or 
appointment proceedings after a decedent's death." There was no Idaho filing prior to the 
Utah filing or thereafter. That brings Paragraph (b) of the statute into play. Once a 
proceeding is filed: "Venue for all subsequent proceedings within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the court is in the place where the initial proceeding occurred" unless 
transferred. 
When the Idaho petition was filed James was dead and there was no Idaho 
probate proceeding. None has been filed since and cannot be filed. Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-202 provides: 
§ 15-3-202. Appointment Or Testacy Proceedings -- Conflicting Claim 
Of Domicile In Another State. If conflicting claims as to the domicile of a 
decedent are made in a formal testacy or appointment proceeding 
commenced in this state, and in a testacy or appointment proceeding after 
notice pending at the same time in another state, the court of this state must 
stay, dismiss, or permit suitable amendment in, the proceeding here unless it 
is determined that the local proceeding was commenced before the 
proceeding elsewhere. The determination of domicile in the proceeding first 
commenced must be accepted as determinative in the proceeding in this 
state. 
The corresponding Utah Statute is: 
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§ 75-3-202. Appointment or testacy proceedings--Conflicting claim of 
domicile in another state 
If conflicting claims as to the domicile of a decedent are made in a formal 
testacy or appointment proceeding commenced in this state, and in a 
testacy or appointment proceeding after notice pending at the same time in 
another state, the court of this state must stay, dismiss, or permit suitable 
amendment in, the proceeding here unless it is determined that the local 
proceeding was commenced before the proceeding elsewhere. The 
determination of domicile in the proceeding first commenced must be 
accepted as determinative in the formal testacy or appointment proceeding 
in this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-202 (West). 
The only basis for suing Melanie as personal representative is by virtue of the Utah 
appointment but the Uniform Probate Code does not allow for actions outside of the 
probate court of appointment in formal proceedings. 
§ 15-3-105. Proceedings affecting devolution and administration--Jurisdiction 
of subject matter 
Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for determination 
in the informal proceedings provided in this chapter, and may petition the court for 
orders in formal proceedings within the court's jurisdiction including but not 
limited to those described in this chapter. The court has exclusive jurisdiction of 
formal proceedings to determine how decedents' estates subject to the laws of this 
state are to be administered, expended and distributed. 
The corresponding Utah Statute is: 
§ 75-3-105. Proceedings affecting devolution and administration--
Jurisdiction of subject matter 
(1) Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for 
determination in the informal proceedings provided in this chapter and 
may petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within the court's 
jurisdiction, including, but not limited to those described in this chapter. 
The court may hear and determine formal proceedings involving 
administration and distribution of decedents' estates after notice to 
interested persons in conformity with Section 75-1-401 . Persons notified 
are bound though less than all interested persons may have been given 
notice. 
(2) For purposes of this code, formal proceedings involving administration 
and distribution of decedent's estates shall include proceedings to 
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determine the heirs of a decedent and proceedings to construe a duly 
probated will of a decedent, whether or not the estate of the decedent is 
being, or previously has been, administered or distributed. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-3-105 (West). 
Idaho Code §15-3-106 provides: 
§ 15-3-106. Civil litigation--Notice 
Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil litigation and 
jurisdiction of persons, the court may herein determine any other controversy 
concerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative, 
may be a party. Persons notified are bound though less than all interested persons 
may have been given notice. 
There is no corresponding Utah Statute. 
It should be noted that Idaho Code § 15-3-106 was modified from the Uniform 
Probate Code as proposed. The original had language which gave the probate court 
concurrent jurisdiction. The comment to that proposal pointed out that language was not 
appropriate where probate matters are assigned to a branch of a single court. The language 
was removed. The Compilers Notes to Idaho Code §15-3-106 state: 
§ 15-3-106 UNIFORM LAW COMMENTS 
The language in this and the preceding section which divides matters coming 
before the probate court between those within the court's "exclusive" jurisdiction 
and those within its "concurrent" jurisdiction would be inappropriate if probate 
matters were assigned to a branch of a single court of general jurisdiction. The 
Code could be adjusted to an assumption of a single court in various ways. Any 
adjusted version should contain a provision permitting the court to hear and settle 
certain kinds of matters after notice as provided in 1-401. It might be suitable to 
combine the second sentence of3-105 and 3-106 into a single section as follows: 
"The Court may hear and determine formal proceedings involving administration 
and distribution of decedents' estates after notice to interested persons in 
conformity with Section 1-401. Persons notified are bound though less than all 
interested persons may have been given notice." 
An adjusted version also might provide: 
"Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil litigation and 
jurisdiction of persons, the Court (meaning the probate division) may hear and 
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determine any other controversy concerning a succession or to which an estate 
through a personal representative, may be a party." 
The propriety of this sort of statement would depend upon whether questions of 
docketing and assignment, including the division of matters between coordinate 
branches of the Court, should be dealt with by legislation. 
The Joint Editorial Board, in 1975, recommended the addition after "rule", of the 
language "and in proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs which 
concern estates that have not been and cannot now be opened for administration." 
This addition, coupled with the exceptions to the limitations provisions in Section 
3-108 that permit proceedings to construe wills and to determine heirs of intestates 
to be commenced more than three years after death, clarifies the purpose of the 
draftsmen to offer a probate proceeding to aid the determination of rights of 
inheritance of estates that were not opened for administration within the time 
permitted by Section 3-108. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 15-3-106 (West). 
Once appointed, one of the duties of the personal representative 1s to take 
possession of the assets of the estate. 
§ 15-3-709. Duty of personal representative--Possession of estate 
Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will , every personal representative 
has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent's property, 
except that any real property or tangible personal property may be left with or 
surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto unless or until, in the 
judgment of the personal representative, possession of the property by him will be 
necessary for purposes of administration. The request by a personal representative 
for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive evidence, 
in any action against the heir or devisee for possession thereof, that the possession 
of the property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of 
administration. The personal representative shall pay taxes on, and take all steps 
reasonably necessary for the management, protection and preservation of, the estate 
in his possession. He may maintain an action to recover possession of property or 
to determine the title thereto. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 15-3-709 (West). 
The corresponding Utah Statute is: 
§ 75-3-708. Duty of personal representative--Possession of estate 
Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every personal 
representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the 
decedent's property, except that any real property or tangible personal 
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property may be left with or surrendered to the person presumptively 
entitled thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the personal 
representative, possession of the property by him will be necessary for 
purposes of administration. The request by a personal representative for 
delivery of any property possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive 
evidence, in any action against the heir or devisee for possession thereof, 
that the possession of the property by the personal representative is 
necessary for purposes of administration. The personal representative shall 
pay taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for the management, 
protection, and preservation of, the estate in his possession. He may 
maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the 
title thereto. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-3-708 (West). 
§ 15-3-107. Scope of proceedings--Proceedings independent--Exception 
Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5, chapter 3, of this code is 
involved, (1) each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any 
other proceeding involving the same estate; (2) petitions for formal orders of the 
court may combine various requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders 
sought may be finally granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings 
which are particularly described by other sections of this chapter, no petition is 
defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be the subject of 
a final order; (3) proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may be 
combined with proceedings for appointment of personal representatives; and (4) a 
proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is concluded by an order 
making or declining the appointment. 
The corresponding Utah Statue is: 
§ 75-3-106. Scope of proceedings--Proceedings independent-Exception 
(1) Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5, Supervised 
Administration, is involved: 
(a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any 
other proceeding involving the same estate. 
(b) Petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various requests 
for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be finally granted 
without delay. Except as required for proceedings which are particularly 
described by other sections of this chapter, no petition is defective because 
it fails to embrace all matters which might then be the subject of a final 
order. 
(c) Proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may be 
combined with proceedings for appointment of personal representatives. 
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( d) A proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is 
concluded by an order making or declining the appointment. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-3-106 (West). 
To the extent that the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, Idaho Code§ 15-3-
104 are argued to be in conflict with Idaho Code § 1-705(1 ), relied upon by "the Eldest 
Children", the rules of construction provide that, while the statutes are to be construed 
together if possible, if they are actually in conflict, a specific statute will control over the 
more general statute. 
"However, where two statutes appear to apply to the same case or subject 
matter, the specific statute will control over the more general statute." 
Barnes, 133 Idaho at 382, 987 P.2d at 294. 
State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 970,318 P.3d 955, 960 (Ct. App. 2014) 
II. Who Were the Members of Twin G 
There are two circumstances which stand out in this case. The first is how 
incredibly easy it is to claim a membership interest in an LLC. If someone claims to be a 
member it creates a question of fact. The second is that the Secretary of State will file 
anything. It doesn't matter who signs it or what it says. 
The following statements appear in the Supplemental Affidavit of Melanie Slavens 
in Support of Motion to Reconsider Partial Summary Judgment: 
3. I was at all material times an equal member of Twin G Holdings, LLC with 
my deceased husband, James K. Slavens who owned the other one-half 
interest. 
4. At no time did I transfer or agree to transfer my membership interest to 
John C. Slavens, any trust, or any other party. 
8. James Kenneth Slavens never held a less than an equal one-half 
membership interest, with myself owning the other one-half, in Twin G 
Holdings, LLC. As equal members we shared equally in all profits and 
losses. 
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9. I discussed with James Kenneth Slavens the possibility of involving his 
brother, John C. Slavens as a member or manager of Twin G Holdings, 
LLC, on a number of occasions for a variety of business reasons. Never 
was testamentary disposition one of those reasons. At one time we had our 
attorney draft an operating agreement which would have identified John C. 
Slavens as a member but we changed our minds and it was never signed and 
no further steps were taken to create a membership interest in John C. 
Slavens. He was never a member or manager. He had no interest 
whatsoever. 
10. John C. Slavens never participated in the management of Twin G Holdings, 
LLC, did not share in the profits and losses of Twin G Holdings, LLC, is 
not referenced in any of the records of Twin G Holdings, LLC as having 
any capacity whatsoever with the limited liability company, and did not 
receive any K-ls allocating income to him for income tax purposes from 
Twin G Holdings, LLC. 
R. Vol. I, p. 422, L. 14 to p. 424 L. 16. This would appear to create questions of fact. 
The Eldest Children's claims are based upon an alleged trust created by James. The 
items in the Record which existed before James' death are devoid of any reference to a 
trust or any element of a trust. John's affidavit and documents he produced after James's 
death contain the only references to a trust. The unsigned draft operating agreement never 
mentions a trust or a trustee. It references "Johnny C. Slavens" in an individual capacity. 
R. Vol. I, p. 177, L. 8. As a result, the Eldest Children's arguments depend on a 
conclusion that references to John the individual should be read to reference John as 
trustee. At the very least this discrepancy creates a question of fact as to what capacity he 
was referred to. 
At the bottom of Page 16 Respondents Brief actually states in part: "The 
implication is .... " On Page 18 the Respondents brief characterizes a quote from 
Melanie's deposition as attesting the unsigned document is a valid operating agreement. 
The quote says no such thing. In fact, the brief also inserts dates not included in the quote 
without attribution. See discussion at Page 4, Supra. 
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The Eldest Children's argument relies almost entirely on the unsigned draft 
operating agreement. Paragraph 9 of Melanie's supplemental affidavit quoted above sets 
forth specifically the circumstance under which the draft was created. Her statements are 
uncontradicted. There is no evidence that John saw it or even was aware of it prior to 
James death. Inference is not required here. There never was an agreement. 
In the case before us, Birkenmeier testified in his deposition that a formal 
operating agreement was never finalized. The record is replete with 
references to his meeting with the Kellers to discuss forming an LLC. 
Birkenmeier stated that they had "discussed conceptually" how it would 
work; that the terms of the LLC were not "nailed down" and specific 
terms were not agreed to; that details of a possible relationship with the 
Kellers had not been worked out; that actual terms of the business were 
not yet known in their entirety; that all of the terms of an agreement had 
not been defined or fleshed out; and that there was only a draft operating 
agreement provided to him. 
An operating agreement is defined as "any valid agreement or agreements, 
written or oral, among all members, or written declaration by the sole 
member concerning the conduct of the business and affairs of the limited 
liability company and the relative rights, duties and obligations of the 
members and managers, if any." Section 347.015(13). 
Although an operating agreement may be oral, there must still be an 
agreement. Id. A review of the record shows that there was no agreement 
as to material terms between the parties to form Keller Biomedical. Absent 
such an agreement, Birkenmeier could not have been a member of the 
LLC at the time it was formed. The determination of Birkenmeier's 
membership in Keller Biomedical is dispositive regarding whether the trial 
court correctly granted summary judgment on the counts for breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of the duties of loyalty and good faith and fair 
dealing, and constructive trust. 
Birkenmeier v. Keller Biomedical, LLC, 312 S.W.3d 380, 390-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
To be considered in a summary judgment proceeding the unsigned draft operating 
agreement must be offered as competent evidence with proper foundation and must comply 
with the statute of frauds. IRCP 56(e); Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816,979 P.2d 
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1174 (1999); Idaho Code§ 30-6-102, Official Comment, Paragraph (13) [(15)]. The 
unsigned draft operating agreement provides: 
Section 3.04 Term. The Company shall have a perpetual existence unless 
it is dissolved and its affairs would up in accordance with the Act and the 
Operating Agreement. 
R. Vol. I, p. 157, L. 33. As an agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within 
one year, Idaho Code§ 9-505 requires it be subscribed by the party charged. The record is 
devoid of any evidence of circumstances or conduct which would be an exception to the 
statute of frauds . John did not at any time prior to James 's death, either individually or as 
a trustee, make any contribution to Twin G, never participated in its management or 
operation, never enjoyed any benefit nor performed any duty of membership, and did not 
report its income for tax purpose. R. Vol. I, p.423, L. 18. 
The Respondents ' Brief argues at length about Melanie's alleged contradictions. 
The same arguments were made in the summary judgment proceedings and were 
successful as evidenced by the heavy reliance on the trial court's reasoning. There are two 
problems. First, the alleged contradictions are not actually pointed out in the record. 
Second, and more important, contradictions in testimony go to credibility. The credibility 
of the parties should not be assessed by the trial court in a summary judgment proceeding 
and it is reversible e1rnr for a trial court to enter a summary judgment based upon 
credibility. 
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not within the trial 
court's province to assess the credibility of an affiant or deponent when 
credibility can be tested in court before a trier of fact. Lowry v. Ireland 
Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711 , 779 P.2d 22, 25 (Ct.App.1989). When 
assessing the motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to 
be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Furthermore, the 
trial court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
17 
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 
517,808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) . 
The district court's determination, then, was essentially an assessment of 
the parties' credibility. It is not the district court's province to consider 
credibility when making a summary judgment determination. Lowry, 
supra. There remains a genuine question of material fact as to Richard's 
intent during the process of negotiations. If the trier of fact finds that it 
was Richard's intent to deprive his wife of the policy by 
misrepresentations and fraud, then the doctrine of in pari delicto may 
apply. If, on the other hand, the trier of fact finds that Richard's intent was 
merely to wait until the final draft of the agreement was presented to 
Margaret to bring up reassignment of the policy, then the doctrine would 
not apply. 
It is not the place of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the parties 
and then to rule based on that determination. The trier of fact should 
ultimately make the credibility determination taking into account all the 
evidence, including the various letters sent by Richard to Margaret. 
Therefore, it was error for the district court to grant the summary 
judgment based on the doctrine of in pari delicto. 
Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 171-72, 868 P.2d 496, 499-500 (Ct. App. 1994). 
III. Deadman's Statute 
The Eldest Children cite four cases. The applicable rulings are as follows . 
The Court has "not interpreted this provision so broadly as to bar 
testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before a 
decedent[']s death." Montgomery, 147 Idaho at 8, 205 P.3d at 657. 
Additionally, I.R.E. 601(b) "does not apply where .. . the action is not 
against the executor or administrator of an estate and the claim does not 
represent a demand against the estate." Rowan v. Riley, 139 Idaho 49, 54, 
72 P.3d 889, 894 (2003). Nor does it apply "when the testimony is being 
offered to defend against a counterclaim." Lunders, 131 Idaho at 699, 963 
P .2d at 3 82. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by * 516 
**496 allowing April's testimony because I.R.E. 601 (b) allows a party to 
testify to unwritten communication with the deceased if the party's claim 
is not against the estate. For example, in Argyle v. Slemaker the plaintiff 
sought to testify regarding certain communications with the deceased in a 
property dispute. 99 Idaho 544, 545-46, 547, 585 P.2d 954, 955-56, 957 
(1978). The plaintiff brought a claim against the decedent's estate and also 
the decedent's grantee, a third party corporation. Id. at 545-46, 585 P .2d at 
955-56. "An additional reason" the Court held that the plaintiffs 
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testimony was not barred was because the deadman's statute "prohibits 
testimony introduced against the estate of a deceased person," but "does 
not prohibit the admissibility of this evidence as against ... a corporation." 
Id. at 547-48, 585 P.2d at 957-58. Similarly, April's testimony was 
prohibited as to her fraud claim against Christa's estate, but her testimony 
was not prohibited as to her claims against CBI. The district court 
recognized this distinction with the limiting instruction. Therefore, this 
Court concludes that the district court perceived the admissibility of 
April's testimony as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of that 
discretion consistent with LR.E. 601, and reached its decision to admit the 
evidence through an exercise of reason. There was no error in admission 
of this testimony. 
Apr. Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 515-16, 328 P.3d 480, 495-96 (2014). 
Respondents argue that summary judgment was proper in this case because 
appellants' testimony concerning the deed is barred by LC. s 9-202(3), the 
Idaho Dead Man's Statute. That statute provides in part: 
9-202. Who may not testify. The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
3. Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in 
whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or 
administrator, upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, 
As to any communication or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the 
death of such deceased person. (Emphasis added.) 
From an examination of LC. s 9-202(3) it appears that the statute bars (1) 
certain persons from testifying (2) in specified actions (3) as to certain 
communications. All three portions of I.C. s 9-202(3) must be satisfied in order 
for the evidence to be barred. Respondents argue that LC. s 9-202(3) prohibits 
the admission of evidence concerning communications with R. W. Slemaker, 
Sr., or his agent, prior to their deaths. However it is the conclusion of this court 
that the appellant Delbert Argyle's deposition testimony is not barred in the 
instant case. Even assuming that the first two conditions of LC. s 9-202(3) are 
satisfied, the third portion of the statute clearly is not. Statements concerning 
the state of the deed's description upon delivery, do Not involve a 
"communication or agreement, not in writing." LC. s 9-202(3). Although 
testimony concerning oral agreements is barred in appropriate cases, LC. s 9-
202(3) does not bar testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact 
occurring before the decedent's death. Quayle v. Mackert, 92 Idaho 563, 447 
P.2d 679 (1968); Dowdv. Estate of Dowd, 62 Idaho 157, 108 P.2d 287 (1941); 
Hubbardv. Ball, 59 Idaho 78, 81 P.2d 73 (1938). An additional reason for 
holding that the evidence was not barred is that LC. s 9-202(3) prohibits 
testimony introduced against the *548 **958 estate of a deceased person; it 
does not prohibit the admissibility of this evidence as against respondent Wiser 
Oil Company, a corporation. Appellant Delbert Argyle's deposition testimony, 
therefore, was not inadmissible under LC. s 9-202(3) . (Quote uses "s" instead 
of "§") 
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Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 547-48, 585 P.2d 954, 957-58 (1978) 
In Argyle, we found that the third requirement had not been met. However, the 
facts in the present case, as Keeven asserts them in his affidavit, can easily be 
distinguished. In Argyle, the appellants had been barred from testifying that a 
deed to property they had owned was delivered to the respondents without any 
description of the property conveyed. The deed itself clearly existed and this 
Court merely refused to read I.C. § 9-202(3) so broadly as to exclude 
appellant's testimony as to the state of that deed's description upon delivery. 
Such testimony was not a "communication or agreement" within the meaning 
of the Deadman Statute. We said, "I.C. § 9-202(3) does not bar testimony 
concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before decedent's 
death." Id. at 547, 585 P.2d at 957. 
Matter of Estate ofKeeven, 110 Idaho 452,460, 716 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1986). 
Because the question of how I.R.E. 601(b) should be applied will arise on 
remand, we deem it appropriate to briefly address this evidentiary issue. I.R.E. 
60l(b) is virtually identical to I.C. § 9-202(3), the *8 **657 so-called 
"Deadman's Statute."1 We have previously described the appropriate analysis 
to be applied: 
In Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 585 P.2d 954 (1978), we stated that "the 
statute bars (1) certain persons from testifying (2) in specified actions (3) as to 
certain communications. All three portions of I.C. § 9-202(3) must be satisfied 
in order for the evidence to be barred." Id. at 547, 585 P.2d at 957. 
Matter of Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho 452,460, 716 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1986). 
Given the virtual identity of the rule and the statute, this analysis continues to 
be appropriate. We have not interpreted this provision so broadly as to bar 
testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before a 
decedents death. Id. When testimony of an alleged oral agreement is presented 
alone, it is inadmissible; however, "written evidence to substantiate the alleged 
agreement" is admissible. Id. 
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 7-8 , 205 P.3d 650, 656-57 (2009). 
Until Montgomery the cited cases seem to consistently hold that the Deadman's 
Statute would apply according to its tenns but not beyond. Here, John purportedly assigned 
an interest to the Eldest Children. They filed an action against James's personal 
representative. In that action, John submitted an affidavit setting forth a purported oral 
agreement with James to form a trust in favor of the Eldest Children. These facts would 
appear to fall squarely with the statute. 
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The Eldest Children argue the statement of an oral agreement is admissible under 
Montgomery because there is documentary evidence corroborating such a trust. This 
argument raises two questions. First, does the last sentence of the Montgomery quote allow 
admission of the alleged oral agreement by the decedent or just the admission of the 
written documentation substantiating an agreement. 
The second issue is whether the written documentation relied upon by the Eldest 
Children actually substantiates the alleged oral agreement. The alleged oral agreement 
purportedly created a trust. The unsigned draft operating agreement does not mention a 
trust at all much less identify a trustee, identify property subject to the trust, identify the 
beneficiaries, or describe the manner in which the trust property is to be administered and 
used. Bliss v. Bliss, 20 Idaho 467, 119 P. 451 (1911 ). It is also hearsay and offered without 
foundation. An e-mail train upon which John relies is also silent as to the existence of a 
trust and as to the Bliss elements. The entire record which existed prior to James's death is 
silent as to the existence of a trust and as to the Bliss elements. 
John has a purpose. The day after James died he arranged for breaking into 
James's office and the seizure of James ' s and Melanie's personal records. R. Vol. I, p. 
451, L. 14 top. 453, L. 8; R. Vol. I, p.456, L. 1; R. Vol. I, p.215, pg.94, L. 1 to pg. 97. L. 
25. He met with Melanie within a week of her husband's death and told her he was going 
to take Twin G and all of its assets. R. Vol. I, p.219, pg. 137, L. 1 top. 220, pg. 138, L. 18. 
Note that he did not reference a trust. 
John and James had a major falling out and James didn't trust John. His self 
serving statement that James had orally agreed to create a trust divesting Melanie and 
James's youngest children cannot be rebutted directly because James is not here to defend 
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himself. John is free to say whatever he wants because he cannot be contradicted. It would 
appear to be precisely the situation the Deadman's Statute attempts to protect against. 
IV. Oral Trust 
There is no question but that an oral trust can be created, but such a trust requires a 
showing of certain conditions as set forth in Bliss, Supra, and can be created only by 
transfer of property to the trustee. Without property there is no trust. 
A settler creates an express trust by manifesting an intention to create a 
trust. Garner v. Andreasen, 96 Idaho 306, 308, 527 P.2d 1264, 1266 
(1974). A settler's intent "requires no particular words or conduct; the 
settler simply must evidence his intention, upon transferring the property, 
or res, to the trustee, that the trustee will hold the res for the benefit of a 
third person, the beneficiary." Id. A trust's essential characteristic is 
holding the legal and beneficial interests separately in a fiduciary 
relationship. In re Eggan's Estate, 86 Idaho 328, 337, 386 P.2d 563, 568 
(1963). Thus, no particular words are needed to create a trust, as long as 
the words show clear intent to transfer legal title to the trustee to hold the 
beneficial interest for a third person. 
Camp Easton Forever, Inc. v. Inland Nw. Council Boy Scouts of Am., 156 Idaho 893,901, 
332 P.3d 805, 813 (2014). 
We tum now to the dispute as to whether the transferred property was a 
gift or was intended to be the corpus of a trust. 
A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one person is the holder of legal 
title to the property subject to the beneficial interest of another. See, 1 
George Gleason Bogert, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 at 
1-2 (Revised 2d ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,§ 
2 at 6 (1957). The essential characteristics of a trust relationship are 
separation of the legal title from the beneficial interest and the existence of 
fiduciary duties. In re Eggan's Estate, 86 Idaho 328, 337, 386 P.2d 563, 
568 (1963). 
An express trust in personal property may be established by expression of 
the parties either orally or in writing. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 24. A trust is created only if the settler properly manifests an 
intention to create a trust. Garner v. Andreasen, 96 Idaho 306, 308, 527 
P.2d 1264, 1266 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 23. 
This manifestation of intent need not incorporate any specific language, 
and the intent may be expressed by written or spoken words or by conduct. 
Id. § 24. There must be certainty, however, as to the property to be 
subjected to the trust, the identity of the beneficiaries, and the manner in 
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which the trust fund is to be administered and used. Bliss v. Bliss, 20 Idaho 
467,476, 119 P. 451,454 (1911); Bogert, supra, § 45 at 483. 
In this case, the district court found that an enforceable trust had not been 
proved due to lack of evidence of specific terms, such as how the trust was 
to be administered and distributions made to beneficiaries. This finding is 
not challenged on appeal. Dorothea concedes that the district court was 
correct in finding that the intended trust was unenforceable due to 
inadequate specificity of terms. 
Dorothea does, however, take issue with the trial court's further conclusion 
that the assets in question were gifted to Glen. A gift occurs when a 
grantor delivers property to another with a manifested intent to make a gift 
of the property. Matter of Estate of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299,302,543 P.2d 
852, 855 (1975). Delivery is accomplished by actions relinquishing all 
present and future dominion over the property. Id.; Boston Insurance 
Company v. Beckett, 91 Idaho 220,222,419 P.2d 475,477 (1966). An 
intent to make a gift may be proven by direct evidence such as statements 
of donative intent or may be inferred from the circumstances, including 
**1160 *444 the relationship of the donor and donee. 38 C.J.S. Gifts§ 15 
at 792 (1943). 
Because we have held that the involved property must be deemed 
community property, the intent of both William and Dorothea determines 
the legal consequence of the transfers to Glen. As noted above, under 
Idaho law, one spouse may not make a gift of community property without 
the consent of the other. Anderson, 77 Idaho at 378,292 P.2d at 763 
Estate of Hull v. Williams , 126 Idaho 437, 443-44, 885 P.2d 1153, 1159-60 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
Every trust must begin with a gift because, in the absence of assets, the trust is incapable of 
giving consideration. Therefore, in the absence of a gift there is no trust. Restatement 
(third) of Trusts§ 16 (2003). 
Melanie doesn't argue the statute of frauds applies to the creation of a trust. She 
argues there is no trust because, absent John's purported agreement with a deadman, there 
is nothing in the record to show the intent to create a trust. Secondly, she argues there is 
no trust because there was never transfer of a membership or other interest in Twin G to 
John by actions relinquishing all present and future dominion over the property. Thirdly, 
she argues that she never consented to transfer of her interest in the property. 
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V. The Signed and Delivered Amended Certificate 
John claims the purpose of the "Amended Certificate" (R. Vol. I, p. 234, L. 1) was 
to transfer an interest he owned. But that document was prepared and submitted by James 
to John for signature. Melanie makes the following statements in her supplemental 
affidavit: 
11. In the spring of 2011 there was a falling out between my husband 
James Kenneth Slavens and John C. Slavens which involved some 
questionable real estate dealings leading him no longer to trust John 
C. Slavens. 
12. James Kenneth Slavens and myself had multiple conversations 
about our fear that John C. Slavens might claim some interest in the 
LLC in which we planned to move a significant amount of our 
assets into for the benefit of ourselves for retirement purposes then 
upon our deaths to the benefit of our five children, including the 
three claimants in this action. 
13. We agreed that to avoid the possibility of such a claim, James 
Kenneth Slavens might require John C. Slavens to execute the 
Amendment of Certificate of Organization referenced in paragraph 
16 of the affidavit of John C. Slavens making clear he had no 
interest and to end any possibility of an adverse claim against the 
LLC by him. From my conversations with my husband and my 
direct involvement in the process I understood he made clear to 
John C. Slavens his very specific intent that John C. Slavens be 
precluded from asserting any such claim. After that we moved the 
assets into the LLC. 
R. Vol. I, p. 423. L. 1. 
The intent was not to transfer a nonexistent interest in Twin G, but to preclude John 
from claiming such an interest. 
John repeatedly asserts that he delivered the amended certificate to James 
conditioned upon it being used by James and James alone. There is nothing in the record 
confirming such an express condition. It doesn't appear on the document. R. Vol. I, p. 234, 
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L. 1. There is no cover letter or other document to refer to it. We have only John's 
statements in his 1st Affidavit of John G. Slavens as follows: 
15. At James Kenneth Slavens' request in the spring of 2011, I also 
signed and conditionally delivered to James Kenneth Slavens 
documents prepared by him, for his use only, to facilitate James 
Kenneth Slavens and Melanie A. Slavens taking title to the 
ownership interest I have held in and of Twin G Holdings, LLC, on 
the terms explained in ,r 11 above, specifically an Amendment to 
Certificate of Organization relating to Twin G Holdings, LLC; 
16. I understood that James Kenneth Slavens wanted to possess such 
Amendment of Certificate of Organization as signed by me (John C 
Slavens) for possible use only by James Kenneth Slavens for 
among other reasons to avoid that ownership of Twin G Holdings, 
LLC, becoming part of my estate, subject to my testamentary 
documents and claims of my heirs, devisees and creditors had I 
died while yet holding ownership interest in Twin G Holdings, 
LLC; 
17. James Kenneth Slavens died on December 12, 2012, without 
having filed with the Idaho Secretary of State or otherwise used or 
made any assertions on the basis of that Amendment of Certificate 
of Organization as signed by me (John C Slavens) and given to 
James Kenneth Slavens for his use only; 
R. Vol. I, p. 149, L. 20 top. 150, L. 2. 
John's affidavit fails to establish how the "express condition" was made or if, 
when, and how it was communicated to James or Melanie. His statements in his affidavit 
don't establish it was ever communicated to them. We do know that after James and 
Melanie received the amended certificate they relied upon it and began transferring 
significant jointly owned assets into Twin G. R. Vol. I, p. 301 , L. 16 top. 305, L. 1; R. 
Vol. I, p. 424, L. 9. We also know that there was nothing in the Secretary of State's office 
prior to James ' s death showing any interest in John. R. Vol. I, p . 427 L. 1 top. 446 L. 25. 
There was no need to file the amended ce1iificate unless John made a move against Twin G 
as James and Melanie feared. 
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When he made the move, Melanie filed it. R. Vol. I, p. 302, L. 13; R. Vol. I, p. 240, 
L. 1. 
On Page 30 of the Respondents' Brief it refers to the Record to support an 
argument that circumstantial evidence supports the claim of a condition. The portions of 
the record cited don't seem to support the arguments. The e-mail doesn't address Twin G, 
the amended certificate, or a condition. The references to Melanie's testimony and 
admissions don't show a condition and only generally discuss Melanie not being a party to 
all conversations. There is nothing to establish John communicated the condition to James 
or Melanie though the argument tries to infer it. 
On Page 31 , the Respondent's Brief states: "Jim twice assured Johnny that the 
purpose of his holding the 99% was for estate planning purposes, to make certain Jim's 
children received it." There is no reference to the Record supporting this statement. John's 
affidavit does state: 
11. At the request of James Kenneth Slavens, I agreed to hold 99% of 
the ownership interest and sharing ratio of Twin G Holdings, LLC, 
a. For the benefit of James Kenneth Slavens, and 
b. After his death, for the benefit of his three oldest children, 
James Adam Slavens, Alexa Slavens and Tanner Slavens in 
equal 1;3 shares of that 99%. 
R. Vol. I, p. 3, L. 25. Beyond this, the Record appears silent. 
VI. Melanie's Interest 
John, as a trustee, claims to have owned an interest in Twin G based on an oral 
agreement. He corroborates this claim with the unsigned draft operating agreement and e-
mails neither of which reference a trust. 
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Melanie claims to own an interest in Twin G based upon an oral agreement and 
contribution of her interest in substantial assets. She corroborates this claim with her 
having jointly received the income from Twin G, having jointly reported its income for tax 
purposes, and having shared in the management of the LLC 
The Eldest Children rely on the fact that the Secretary of State's records did not 
show Melanie as a member or manager during James' s lifetime. That is correct. On the 
other hand, those same records do not identify John, either individually or as trustee, as a 
member or manager during James' s lifetime. 
Melanie relies on the fact that John, during James's lifetime, did not receive any 
income or benefit from Twin G, did not participate in its management or operation and did 
not report any of its income for tax purposes. She also relies on the fact that there is 
nothing confirming the existence of a trust such as registration, a tax ID number, a bank 
account, etc. 
How is it that John's claim can be held to show an interest as a matter oflaw and 
Melanie's claim is disregarded. It would seem there is more evidence supporting her claim 
than John's. Melanie paid for her interest by contributing substantial assets . John paid 
nothing. 
VII. Effect of Death on a Membership 
The Eldest Children correctly point out that, upon the death of a member, the 
interest that passes to the estate is a transferable interest. Idaho Code § 30-25-502. But if 
the interest is Melanie's she retains it. The record also has a conflict. John claims the 
Eldest Children are the sole members while also claiming he retained membership which 
he conditionally resigned. If John had a membership interest and is still a member, the 
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Eldest Children are not members. If John did hold a 99% membership interest and resigned 
it, it is a dissociation and no members remain. That is an event causing dissolution. Idaho 
Code § 30-25-701. 
All of this raises an interesting issue. All of the contributions of assets were by 
James and Melanie. All would be credited to their capital account. The percentage of 
ownership does not affect the application of contributions. John contributed nothing. The 
claimed trust would have a capital account of zero. Upon dissolution the capital accounts 
are equalized before distribution to the member's prorata to their interests. Idaho Code§ 
30-25-707. 
VIII. Failure of the Condition 
The Eldest Children argue that Melanie has raised a new issue on appeal. The 
document purporting to transfer the interest to the Eldest Children has, as an express 
condition, that it be signed and acknowledged by them. It has not been signed. This 
document is part of the Record and speaks for itself. It was placed in the Record by the 
affidavit of John Slavens. R. Vol. I, p. 182, L. 1. These "facts and materials" are not new 
nor being presented for the first time on appeal. They became part of the Record August 
14, 2013 . R. Vol. I, p. 146, L. 1. It is perfectly appropriate to comment on the contents of 
this document on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants request the Judgment be reversed for lack of jurisdiction and the 
matter be remanded with instructions to dismiss. Alternatively, the Appellants request 
the judgment be set aside and the case remanded for trial on the merits as to all issues 
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fairly raised by the pleadings. The Appellants request that they be awarded attorney's 
fees and costs. 
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DATED this _jL_ day of April, 2016. 
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE, 
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